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While institutional pressure and shareholder action has increased board of director accountability 
with regard to overseeing the operational needs of the firm to maintain both legitimacy and good 
legal standing, as an individual and as a board; there has been a simultaneous push to increase 
the cognitive diversity of boards of directors.  The increased focus on operational performance 
measures coupled with changes to the composition of the board can have a serious impact on the 
ability for boards to communicate and reach consensus on discretionary activities.  We propose 
to study whether cognitive diversity reduces the number and type of sustainability initiatives.  
While tenure and time together on the board have positive impacts on the ability of boards to 
initiate action, cognitive diversity actually serves to reduce the number of initiatives firms 
undertake and appears to reduce financial performance of the firms studied.  These hypotheses 
are tested through an analysis of almost 150,000 voluntary disclosures, in the form of press 
releases, from non-financial firms in the Fortune 500, a sample which also includes an analysis 
of the profiles of 3,833 individual board directors using traditional and newly-developed 
measures of cognitive diversity.  This paper demonstrates that while higher levels of cognitive 
diversity do not affect the ability for boards to reach consensus on operational initiatives, these 
higher levels of cognitive diversity do impact the ability to engage in discretionary initiatives.   
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INTRODUCTION 
US firms have been nudged by legislation such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act to 
increase their board of directors’ cognitive diversity, defined as variability in experiences and 
background, while concurrently embracing the trend in demographic diversity, which 
encompasses variability in age, gender, nationality and race (Jackson, May and Whitney, 1995). 
Diversity, the infusion of multifarious individual attributes within the firm (Ruigrok, et al., 
2006), is seen as a panacea for many organizational shortcomings by both academics and 
practitioners alike (Bell, 2007; Boris, 2010; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Erhardt, et al., 2003; 
Goodstein, et al., 1994; Grosvold, et al., 2007; Hambrick, et al., 1996; Kosnick, 1990; Miller, et 
al., 2009; Nielsen and Huse, 2010). One such shortcoming that has generated particular interest 
within the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are sustainability initiatives defined as 
efforts to reduce the negative environmental externalities caused by the economic activities of 
firms (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996) or perhaps more positively “the ability of current 
generations to meet their needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
theirs” (World Commission on Economic Development: 16)  (Marshall and Brown, 2003; Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Fisher-Varden and Thorburn, 2010; Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996).   Somewhat surprisingly, cognitive board diversity and its impact on 
sustainability initiatives have not been linked in the literature.   This is an important omission 
since boards have ultimate responsibility for their firms’ allocation of resources to initiatives that 
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address sustainability.  If the number and types of sustainability initiatives undertaken by a firm 
is differentially impacted by the cognitive diversity of its board, it could help explain why certain 
firms are more likely to adopt a shared values approach to corporate strategy (Porter & Kramer, 
2011).  The purpose of this dissertation is to begin to address this issue by examining the 
following the research question; “What is the impact of cognitive diversity among the members 
of a firm’s board on the type and number of their sustainability initiatives?”    
Despite legislation like Sarbanes-Oxley, there is still confusion as to what comprises 
cognitive diversity.  The concept of cognitive diversity defines the board by its variability with 
regard to experiences, background and values, as compared with demographic diversity in which 
boards would be defined by the variability with regard to age, gender and race (Jackson, May 
and Whitney, 1995).  Institutional and stakeholder pressures have led firms to redefine what 
constitutes a diverse group of directors (Peterson, et al., 2007; Ramirez, 2003; Nguyen and Faff, 
2007; Grosvold, et al., 2007; Miller and Triana, 2009; Tsui and Gutek, 1999; Boris, 2010; 
Zanoni, 2010).  Board diversity is no longer a binary insider/outsider paradigm or a comparison 
of demographic characteristics amongst the board to constituent groups; the board is now 
fractured across demographic and more importantly cognitive dimensions (Lau and McLaughlin, 
2005).   Yet there is little dispute amongst proponents of Upper Echelon Theory (Argote and 
Greve, 2007; Hambrick, 2007) that cognitively-diverse boards’ attention and the guidance they 
provide to top management teams are influenced significantly by their own experiences, 
backgrounds and values (Hambrick, 2007; Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson, 2010; Marquis and 
Lounsberry, 2007).   
In general, cognitive diversity amongst the board is perceived as beneficial as it is 
associated with organizational innovation (Camelo-Ordaz, Hernandez-Lara and Valle-Cabrera, 
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2005; Bantel and Jackson, 1989) and creativity (Wiersma and Bantel, 1992).  We would expect 
that the communication between board directors with very different backgrounds, values and 
experiences would be much richer in terms of the transfer of information although much more 
open to misinterpretation, than in boards with little cognitive diversity (Granovetter, 1973).    
However, cognitive diversity among board members can lead to increased coordination costs, 
director conflict, mistrust, low motivation and low quality communication (Ruigrok, et al., 2006 
and Knight, et al., 1999).  In the context of top management teams, homogeneity has been shown 
to outperform heterogeneity as the group can be left fractured across the multiple dimensions of 
cognitive diversity (Thatcher and Patel, 2011 and Hambrick, et al., 1996), a concept captured in 
recent research on fault lines (Lau and Murnighan, 2005).  Cognitively-diverse boards, faced 
with a need to make a decision where there are differing views regarding goals or means for 
achieving them, have decision processes characterized by “quasi-resolution” of conflict (Cyert 
and March, 1963; 164) and shifting board attention (Ocasio, 1997) among a board fractured 
along fault lines by values, experiences and backgrounds (Lau and Murnighan, 2005), struggling 
through time-constrained board agendas (Tuggle, et al., 2010).       
Within the broader CSR research stream, sustainability initiatives are a set of decisions 
boards need to address.  These decisions have generated a great deal of research interest (Hart 
and Ahuja, 1996; Heintzman, 2010; Karpoff, Lott and Wherly, 2005; Fisher-Vanden and 
Thorburn, 2010; King and Lenox, 2000 & 2001; Walls, Berrone and Phan, 2012) but limited 
theoretical insights.  The literature has categorized sustainable initiatives as either operational 
(Gilley, et al., 2000) or environmental stewardship, programs which have been described as 
opportunities for the firm to improve the image of the firm or its industry (Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996 and King and Lenox, 2000).  Operational sustainability initiatives are those 
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generating revenue through identification of new markets and products; those reducing expenses 
by saving on energy and disposal costs; those offering a direct and observable connection to 
measurable benefits and those having more predictable returns.  Discretionary sustainability 
initiatives, not mandated by government policies or shareholder expectations, often fall within 
the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR); where outcomes and therefore the rewards 
and punitive measures are more open to interpretation and manipulation (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2010).  These initiatives may still have a financial impact and can be of several types, 
including aspirational, helping to save the Earth; explanatory, helping stakeholders understand 
how the firm is “green”; laudatory, helping communities and being rewarded with recognition; or 
simply going beyond what’s expected, organizing and recycling post-consumer products.   
Operational sustainability initiatives have a close connection to the “bottom line”, 
whether it is a transition to a more fuel efficient truck fleet or the inclusion of hydropower to the 
infrastructure of a new computer facility.  Discretionary sustainability initiatives, unlike 
operational sustainability initiatives do not have a clear causally-defined relationship between the 
initiative and financial performance.  As a result they are one step removed from the socially 
understood and legitimized fiduciary duties of boards.    When cognitively-diverse boards do not 
have a compelling need to launch discretionary sustainable initiatives, and given how often these 
initiatives can represent a change in position for the firm, particularly when new; boards may be 
divided by their world views and personal biases (Dahlin, Weingart and Hinds, 2005; Wiersma 
and Bantel, 1992).  The challenges in arriving at a consensus on discretionary initiatives may 
cause busy boards to focus only on those initiatives most closely aligned with their fiduciary 
duties and institutional norms and yet it may be that the engagement of these discretionary 
initiatives is what separates industry leaders from their lagging rivals. 
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While boards can become fractured by their personal experiences, values and beliefs, in 
reality board directors may have long concurrent service, here called tenure.  Joint service on the 
board allows for directors to have common experiences and become socialized (Michel and 
Hambrick, 1992) reducing coordination costs and perhaps even altering director perceptions and 
outlooks (Kosnick, 1990).   
 Drawing on a sample of 356 non-financial sector US firms from the Fortune 500, we 
constructed a database of 3,833 board directors and almost 150,000 corporate initiatives over a 
period from 2004-2009.  For each director, we collected demographic and cognitive diversity 
characteristics, and for each initiative, we determined whether it was related to sustainability, and 
categorized it as either operational or discretionary.  We test hypotheses that cognitively-diverse 
boards of directors will place a priority on their fiduciary duties with regard to operational 
sustainable initiatives.   
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. This paper creates a broader 
definition of cognitive diversity.  The board of directors is envisioned, first theoretically and then 
operationally, as a group of individuals with a complex set of interacting belief systems derived 
from their values, experiences and backgrounds. Unlike previous research, this research focuses 
on the power of cognitive diversity to constrict the ability for meaningful discussion.  A lack of 
certainty as to outcomes, institutional norms or institutional controls allows for firms to create 
and justify a wide range of potential activities.  In this way the paper links the findings of Upper 
Echelon Theory (Hambrick, 1996) with those from institutional researchers (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Montes and Sancho, 2010; and George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, and 
Barden, 2006).  Further, this paper heeds the call from Tsui and Gutek (1999) for more 
sophisticated constructs which develop a richer definition of diversity along with the 
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determination by Walls, Berrone, and Phan (2012) that little has been done to theoretically link 
corporate governance and sustainability; this paper introduces and empirically tests the 
relationship between a composite measure of cognitive diversity and sustainability.  Few 
empirical articles have attempted to explicitly include the fully-developed constructs at 
consideration here.  Either firms are monolithic with no role for individuals (Klassen and 
McLaughlin, 1996; Fisher-Varden and Thorburn, 2010; and Lenox and King, 2000) or boards are 
diverse individuals and the particulars of the decision at hand are not explored (Coffey and 
Wang, 1998; Forker, 1992; Erhardt, et al., 2003; and Dahlin et al., 2005).  Delmas and Burbano 
(2011); Carter, Simpkins and Simpson (2002); Ricart, Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005); Berrone, 
Cruz, Gomez-Mejia and Larraza-Kintana (2010) and Walls, et al., (2012) have also tied 
corporate governance and sustainability but to my knowledge there has been no research, in 
either academic journals or amongst the many working papers available, which connects 
cognitively-diverse directors with their strategic decisions in the closely-watched and 
strategically important field of sustainability.   
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Two theories frame our understanding of how the cognitive diversity of boards of directors effect 
the number and type of initiatives they undertake.  To develop our hypotheses we link Upper 
Echelon Theory, which informs our understanding of cognitive diversity and the ways in which 
it impacts action (Hambrick, et al., 1986) and Institutional Theory, which guides our 
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understanding of directors as actors seeking to maintain individual and organizational legitimacy 
(George, et al., 2006). 
 
Upper Echelon Theory, Cognitive Diversity and Strategic Initiatives  
 
Upper echelon theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) focuses on the way values, 
experiences and perceptions influence how directors perceive the world and how those 
perceptions influence action.  Hambrick (2007: 335) advanced the conviction that “researchers 
can reliably use information on executives’ functional backgrounds, industry and firm tenures, 
educational credentials, and affiliations to develop predictions of strategic actions.”  Extending 
this logic to the board, Tuggle, et al. (2010) found support for the view that directors’ 
characteristics impact discussions in the board room.  Hambrick and Mason (1984) reasoned that 
the more complicated a decision such as those involving innovation, complexity and finance the 
more likely directors will bring their personal biases and perceptions to the discussion.  Bantel 
and Jackson (1989) went farther stating that as complexity of the decisions faced by the board 
increases; groups are more effective when they are composed of individuals having a variety of 
educational and functional backgrounds. This variety is associated with being able to access a 
broader set of information, alternatives and perspectives.  However, variability has its downside 
as well.  When boards are diverse, complex or controversial decisions can lead to fractures 
among board members and constrain discussions (Thatcher and Patel, 2011, Hambrick, 1996, 
and Tuggle, et al., 2010).   
While a precise definition of cognitive diversity has proven elusive and mutable (Putnam, 
2011) it has become increasingly inclusive.  Just a generation ago diversity referred to a 
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director’s affiliations outside their positional roles.  As the boardroom and the workplace became 
more diverse, theory has struggled to keep pace.  Scholars initially focused on demographic traits 
or surface-level attributes including age, race, gender, nationality, physical appearance, language 
and dialect (Jackson, et al., 2005; Peterson, et al., 2007; Ramirez, 2003; Nguyen and Faff, 2007; 
Grosvold, et al., 2007; Miller and Triana, 2009; Tsui and Gutek, 1999).  The inclusion of 
surface-level attributes resulted in limited contributions due to the lack of a strong theoretical 
foundation and explanatory power (Ramirez, 2003).  In response to ongoing academic inquiry 
and institutional pressures, researchers have expanded the diversity perspective to include 
cognitive, or deep-level, attributes such as education, tenure, occupation, religion, functional 
background, socioeconomic status, values, veteran status, social memberships and affiliations, 
sexual orientation and differently-abled status (Jackson, et al., 2005; Finkelstein, et al., 2009; 
Tsui and Gutek, 1999, Goodstein, et al., 1994, Boris, 2010; Zanoni, 2010). As a result of 
variability in deep-level attributes cognitively-diverse boards of directors have a broad range of 
viewpoints and biases (Jackson, et al., 2005).  This is because each board member will select and 
use information sources in ways consistent with their own perspective (Dahlin, Weingart and 
Hinds, 2005; Tuggle, et al., 2010).  For scholars studying the links between creativity, the variety 
of innovative idea and their impact on the number and type of strategic initiatives cognitive 
diversity is viewed favorably (Wiersma and Bantel, 1992).  Diversity among board members 
provides the opportunity to use their diverse experiences and resulting viewpoints to identify a 
greater number and variety of initiatives when addressing a strategic issue. 
However, cognitive diversity is not without costs (Milliken and Martins, 1996).  
Goodstein, et al. (1994) found that occupationally-diverse boards were less likely to agree on 
strategic actions.  Erhardt, et al., (2003) found that experience diversity had a negative impact on 
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communication among the executives.  Functional diversity in top management teams increases 
coordination costs and as a result the time and effort required to reach consensus (Knight et al., 
1999; Shrader et al. 1997). Hambrick, et al., (1996) found that diverse top management teams, 
where diversity was defined among functional, educational and tenure attributes, were 
outperformed by homogeneous teams.  The more diverse teams were slower to act and less likely 
to respond to competitor moves.   Their finding suggests that cognitive diversity may impair 
group decision making and in some cases overwhelm its innovation benefits.  While diversity 
doesn’t halt the resolution of an issue, it may impact the number and types of initiatives 
undertaken for an issue, especially when they require boards to reconcile initiatives that are 
inconsistent with some of their members’ individual perspectives. 
   
Institutional Theory, Cognitive Diversity and Strategic Initiatives 
 
For institutional theorists, organizations and individuals seek legitimacy which involves 
undertaking initiatives that are viewed as “appropriate” (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 
1991; Rumelt, et al., 1994).  Institutional theory suggests there are restraints on directors’ action, 
the mechanisms by which directors resolve conflict and the behaviors which firms engage in to 
maintain legitimacy and to avoid sanctions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Miller and Shull, 
1962).  Political and normative pressures are applied to directors and their firms (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) from governmental entities, stakeholders, shareholders, customers, partners and 
rivals.    
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Early institutional researchers saw the firm as limited by the constraints of seeking and 
maintaining legitimacy (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983), but a more recent stream of research has 
posited a more active role for key individuals and the firm.  George, et al., (2006) focused on an 
active role for the individual (director) in “the perpetuation of institutions, or in their creation or 
change” (George, 2006: 348) which determines how the firm behaves and what initiatives it 
undertakes.    Shropshire (2010) conceptualized directors as conduits for the exchange of 
knowledge between firms.  For Mizruchi (1996), directors actively share practices, policies and 
initiatives developed in organizations with which they are associated, bring them back to their 
firm, and also share them with firms they serve.  The process of sharing and adoption reinforces 
the legitimacy and stability of those initiatives (Rumelt, et al., 1994).  Useem (1982) also 
conceptualized board interlocks as vehicles for sharing and learning, with directors actively 
scanning and sharing new information, initiatives and successes which results in granting greater 
legitimacy to knowledge passed between directors.     
Directors, especially those with long service, and those with board interlocks, become 
institutionalized (Kosnik, 1990).  With increased tenure and increased legitimacy they establish 
tradition, standard practices and values (Katz, 1982; Kosnik, 1990). However, legitimacy can be 
mutable and manipulated (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010).  Directors can engage in 
behaviors that are symbolic rather than substantive, garner all of the reputational benefits of 
substantive action, and possibly even avoid sanction for themselves and the firm (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2010).   
The view of the director as playing an active role in creating their environment is 
supported by applied research as well.  Lawler, Finegold, Benson and Conger (2002) studied 
how directors spent their time and what roles directors viewed as most important.  The four most 
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important tasks were focused on actively shaping strategy, including “identifying possible threats 
and opportunities to the future of the company” (Lawler, et al., 2002: 316) which was the board 
activity that yielded the best ROI and market returns. This perspective is also supported by 
Grady (1999) who found that companies switching to proactive board processes focus on “long-
term issues such as strategy, corporate culture, and initiatives for change” (Grady, 1999: 20).     
Our review of the application of institutional and upper echelon theories to boards of 
directors reveals a tension.  Upper echelon research provides evidence that when boards have 
high levels of cognitive diversity, it leads to varying perspectives regarding the type, importance, 
credibility, goals and means for achieving strategic initiative (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Tuggle, et al., 2010; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Marquis and Lounsberry, 2007).  
However, in the quest to achieve legitimacy, the variety in perspectives resulting from 
cognitively-diverse boards can lead to long payback times, contested decisions, consume 
resources and impact the reputation of the firm (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  In other words, 
the level of cognitive diversity amongst the board directors will impact the level of conflict, and 
therefore the number of initiatives under consideration, amongst board of directors’ perceptions 
and viewpoints, as they decide on strategic initiatives that have legitimacy-related consequences 
(Tuggle, et al., 2010).  Boards with high cognitive diversity have by definition more fault lines 
than homogenous boards, with lower cognitive diversity and therefore more conflict (Lau and 
McLaughlin, 2005). 
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Operational and Discretionary Sustainability Initiatives 
 
There is evidence that firms, and therefore shareholders, benefit from any kind of sustainable 
initiatives (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; King and Lenox, 2001; Karpoff, et al., 2005; Hart 
and Ahuja, 1996; Hamilton, 1995; Gilley, et al., 2000; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2010; 
Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Luo, et al., 2012); here defined as activities which include 
consideration of environmental performance as part of a triple bottom line (Marshall and Brown, 
2003; Schendler, 2009; Roy, Boiral and Paille, 2013),  Even when firms and their shareholders 
do not directly benefit there may be societal benefits (King and Lenox, 2000) as sustainability 
can be thought of as “the ability of current generations to meet their needs without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet theirs” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 2013: 16).   
Both operational and discretionary sustainability initiatives, specific efforts to reduce the 
negative externalities related to economic activity, are complicated strategic activities 
(Schendler, 2009) that could result in conflict amongst directors based on their personal biases 
and past experience.  Operational sustainability initiatives are those that have a clear payback 
and a close tie to a firm’s operations.  Operational initiatives such as, total quality management, 
just-in-time techniques and benchmarking have been widely adopted (Yasin, Augusto, Lisboa 
and Miller (2011) as efficiency efforts in the realm of sustainability.    Directors seeking 
legitimacy for themselves and their firms identify the absence of these types of initiatives as a 
threat to the organization and guide the firm towards their implementation (Lawler, et al., 2002).  
Directors in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley understand very clearly their fiduciary duties to the firm 
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and their shareholders.  There are real sanctions for directors who do not operate in a manner 
consistent with maximizing shareholder returns (Rezaee, 2007).  Operational sustainability 
initiatives, as revenue-enhancing or cost-cutting, present very real ways for directors to impact 
the financial performance of the firm.  We would expect both cognitively homogeneous and 
diverse boards of directors to focus on coming to consensus on operational sustainability 
initiatives and place their fiduciary duties in primacy above their personal biases.    
In contrast to operational initiatives, Boiral and Paille (2012) have suggested that 
discretionary initiatives are unrewarded by the firm, and by extension, the market.  Discretionary 
initiatives, which are activities that are voluntary but often important and hard to measure 
(Smith, 2010), often result from an understanding of good corporate citizenship, and as such, this 
type of sustainability initiative have less clear connections to both the performance and 
legitimacy of the firm and the legitimacy of the individual directors.    Discretionary 
sustainability initiatives are generally more aspirational in nature, asking the firm to go beyond 
what is expected.  Due to their aspirational nature and causal ambiguity, discretionary 
sustainability initiatives face questions about their efficacy; underlying cause-effect 
relationships; and create uncertainty for directors.  Thus, decisions related to discretionary 
sustainability initiatives may result in value-based conflict for directors facing time-constrained 
agendas and limited attention (Ocasio, 1997; Tuggle, et al., 2010).  As a result, cognitively-
diverse boards may face a clash of values exacerbated by communication failures and 
disagreements about the validity of the “facts”.  With short, crowded agendas, busy directors 
may seek compromise, adopt a wait and see attitude, or table discretionary initiatives. 
An important distinction between operational and discretionary initiatives is the directors’ 
perceptions with regard to their need to maintain legitimacy.  For directors who are not 
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convinced of the cause-effect relationships underlying a discretionary sustainability initiative, 
they can be viewed as less strategic or legitimate and therefore not worthy of directors’ time.  
Sonenshein, DeCelles and Dutton (2014) have found even among executives who support 
environmental issues, there are doubts about the efficacy of environmental initiatives and their 
role in making a positive change.  Directors might also opine that operationally sustainable 
initiatives should suffice to demonstrate a commitment to sustainability.  It may be easier for a 
cognitively-diverse board to not launch new discretionary initiatives and stay the course since 
conservative thinking requires less effort (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman and Blanchar, 2012).  
Therefore: 
H1:  Boards with high levels of cognitive diversity will engage in fewer sustainability initiatives 
than boards with low levels of cognitive diversity 
 
Moderating Role of Initiative Type 
Porter suggests, “The essence of strategy is choosing to perform activities differently than rivals 
do” (Porter, 1996: 64).  Three implications can be drawn from this.  One, that there are groups of 
activities, or initiatives, that are common across firms, which in this paper are designated as 
operational initiatives.  These are initiatives or opportunities to increase revenue or decrease 
expenses in direct ways and are readily embraced by the organization.    Two, there is a separate 
class of initiatives that are chosen by the top management team (TMT) in consultation with the 
board of directors, which can form the basis for differentiation between the firm and its rivals.  
Three, firms must weigh the “when” and “how” of disclosing these activities.   
15 
 
As George, et al. (2006) found, high-performing firms may be identified by their ability 
to launch initiatives that respond to multiple perceptions of the environment.  Said another way, 
firms which have boards that are able to better digest and synthesize divergent world views, 
composed of the cognitive biases of the individual board directors, and determine an appropriate 
set of responses to environmental threats and opportunities, should have better firm performance.   
While Jackson and Parsa (2009) detail the potential for financial disadvantage due to the 
cost of such discretionary initiatives, links have been formed between discretionary initiatives 
focused around CSR and sustainability.  Those links have been shown to positively impact stock 
prices (Fisher-Varden and Thorburn, 2010 and King and Lenox, 2001).  Discretionary CSR 
initiatives have also been shown to correlate with improved stakeholder impression of the focal 
firm (Jackson and Parsa, 2009).   
Based on the work of George, et al. (2006), high performing boards launch initiatives; 
however firms may find the need to protect their “news” if it is viewed as proprietary in nature, 
or the source of advantage (Barney, 1991).  Even though researchers have found a relationship 
between positive disclosures with regard to environmental performance (Fisher-Varden and 
Thorson, 2010; Lenox and King, 2001), the potential stock gains must be weighed against the 
value of market signals to rivals. Clarkson, et al. (2011) conducted a review of sustainable 
performance in Australia and found little connection between performance and disclosures about 
performance, suggesting some firms are just more likely to disclose information than others.  
Therefore; 
  
H2: The use of a higher percentage of discretionary vs operational initiatives will positively 
moderate the relationship between cognitive diversity and sustainable initiatives. 
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Moderating Role of Tenure 
Tenure, or the length of continual service in the firm or on the board, has been associated with 
positive firm performance  (Pfeffer and Salancik,1980; McEachern,1975),  leads to functional 
specialization by incumbents (Helmich, 1977) and the institutionalization of power within the 
organization (Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 1980).  Pfeffer and Salancik (1980) found that when 
profitability and market performance are positive, executives are retained.  As executives and 
board members become entrenched in their positions, they develop a greater understanding of 
their role through experience, socialization and cohesion (Chao, O’Leary, Wolf, Klein and 
Gardner, 1994; Michel and Hambrick, 1992).  Once entrenched, executives and board members 
remain in place even when there is a negative relationship between tenure and performance 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, (1980).   Therefore tenure has been recognized as critical in understanding 
how boards of directors behave (Hambrick, 2007; Wiersma and Bantel, 1992; Kosnick, 1990).   
There are tremendous benefits to boards serving for a period of time together.  Boards 
with longer-tenured members understand the firm’s traditions and organizational values and will 
adhere to them (Katz, 1992); develop better communication both among the team and external to 
the team (Kosnik, 1990; Zenger and Lawrence, 1989); and develop common perspectives and 
social integration through shared experiences (O’Reilly, 1989).   Thus, tenure reduces the impact 
of cognitive diversity among board members. 
Changes in the tenure of the board occur when boards add new members or when 
incumbent members leave the board. Pfeffer (1983) reasoned that new board members form 
cohorts that become cohesive, conforming, and mutually reinforcing. As a result, cohort 
members are more likely to interact with each other.  New board members have the highest 
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levels of creativity and are most likely to suggest new ideas (Kosnick, 1990).  These new 
members or cohorts reduce the potential of group-think within the board since they bring 
diversity (Kosnick, 1990).  As a result, they increase communication difficulties across cohorts 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989).  Drawing on upper echelon theory, Tuggle, et al., (2010) 
demonstrated that tenure diversity was crucial to the monitoring and advising activities of the 
board.  
Boards which spend time together develop methods of overcoming coordination 
difficulties (Martins and Milliken, 1996).  As board tenure increases, performance of directors 
improves (Katz, 1982) as they learn more about the company, develop richer information 
patterns within the group, and find common perspectives emerging from discussion (Kosnik, 
1990).  As a director becomes more aware of and more engrained in the values and practices of 
the firm, s/he gains a better appreciation of the reputational effects of the firm’s activities, 
becomes more protective of the firm’s legitimacy and therefore demonstrates greater conformity 
(Kosnik, 1990).   
 As a common perspective emerges within the board of directors as to the firm’s place in 
their environment and the steps necessary to maintain that standing, the effect of individual 
directors’ diversity is lessened.  It is replaced with a more homogenized view of the firm which 
should attenuate the negative effect of cognitive diversity on the number of discretionary 
sustainability initiatives.   
The result of this homogenization is that decisions should be arrived at more quickly as 
directors more readily understand each other’s perspectives, communication approaches and 
routines for conflict resolution.  As a result, time constraints in tightly-packed agendas are 
reduced since board members will engage in less disagreement. In other words, there is time to 
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discuss and decide on discretionary sustainability initiatives. However, a negative potential result 
of this homogenization is group think.  Boards with high levels of tenure, defined as tenure 
greater than its peer group (Katz, 1982), produce less-creative and lower-quality decisions 
(Kosnick, 1990). These decisions should take less time to develop and ratify. 
 
H3:  Board tenure positively moderates the cognitive diversity – discretionary sustainability 
initiatives relationship. That is, high cognitively-diverse boards will engage in more 
discretionary sustainability initiatives when they have high levels of tenure. 
 
Methodology 
Sample 
The 356 nonfinancial firms listed in the Fortune 500 during 2004, which were still active in 
2010, were selected as the sample.  Consistent with Gompers, et al., (2003), 58 firms were 
removed from the original sample because they were holding companies or financial/insurance 
firms.  In addition, 86 firms were removed because they either merged or were acquired at some 
point during this period.   The time period 2004-2010 was chosen because it allows sufficient 
time for firms to respond to negative environmental events, including toxic releases and chemical 
spills, as well as initiated sustainability initiatives coming to fruition.  Finally, 2004 was selected 
because this was a Presidential election year in the United States.   Political activity is cyclical in 
the United States, based on Presidential election years.  An election year is likely to identify 
politically active board members and their political affiliation. Contributions cycle up both in 
number (a clearer understanding of the corporate directors’ values) and size (which is more 
likely to put them above the $200 individual reporting threshold of the Federal Election 
Commission {FEC}).   
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Variables and Data Sources 
 
Sustainable Initiatives 
 
Consistent with previous research (Gilley, et al., 2000; Karpoff, et al., 2005; King and Lenox, 
2001; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996) sustainable initiatives were operationalized to include all 
voluntarily disclosures which are public statements by the firm of their own activities.  
Information on voluntary disclosure of corporate initiatives was gathered for most firms from 
their corporate websites in a method consistent with prior research (Forker, 1992, Stevens, et al., 
2005).  Voluntary disclosures, including press releases, SEC documents, Annual Reports and 
Special Reports, are archived online.  In some cases the disclosures were readily available dating 
from the founding of the company; in others the disclosures were available only for the past few 
years.  Lexis-Nexis was used to fill the gaps for those companies which did not report or archive 
their disclosures on their websites during the study period.   
We used two rounds to identify the number of sustainability initiatives as well as the total 
number of initiatives (a control variable for the propensity to disclose) for each firm. 149,958 
voluntary disclosures were identified and evaluated.  We found 4,775 of the disclosures (or 
slightly more than 3%) were related to sustainability.  The initiatives were divided into two 
categories (1) operational of which there were 1,384 and (2) 3,391, discretionary activities. In the 
first round, based on a review of recent literature on sustainability in EBESCO Business Source 
Complete, articles in the Economist and recently published books on sustainability, a number of 
key words were developed.  Any disclosures using a variant of key words such as 
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“sustainability,” “environment,” “green” was counted, as were those that referenced abatement 
or mitigation of EPA issues, those that proposed energy-savings programs, and those that 
involved alternative energy programs.  The sustainable initiatives identified for each firm, based 
on the title of the voluntary disclosure, were tallied.  Two researchers independently reviewed 
the firm voluntary disclosures and used a common coding sheet with key words identified with 
sustainability.  There was one discrepancy based on the definitions.  One researcher missed the 
following press release, which was added to the official tally as an efficiency initiative: “Best 
Buy, Pew Climate Change Center, Best Energy Efficiency Practices”.   
    The purpose of the second round was to identify the propensity of a firm to disclose (a control 
variable) and to identify any sustainability initiatives that did not use the key words in round one. 
Thirty-nine sustainability initiatives were identified, reconciled by the researchers and added to 
the database.     
 
Operational Initiatives 
 
We build on the work of Goodstein, et al., (1994) and Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2010), who 
delineated between superficial and meaningful firm activities.   The coding method used to score 
operational initiatives were of two types: (1) revenue enhancing - those that indicated an attempt 
to grow the firm, introduce a new business, expand successful pilot programs, or secure new 
customers and (2) cost reduction - those which indicated an attempt to reduce operating costs or 
trim expenses, such as decisions to reduce energy usage to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or 
the adoption of tools, ranging from light bulbs to trucks, which are more environmentally 
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friendly.  Pct. Operational reflects the total number of sustainability initiatives that are 
categorized as operational and then divided by the total number of sustainable initiatives. 
 
Discretionary Initiatives 
 
Scallet and Kelly (2010) suggested that individuals desire to feel good about the company they 
are working for and that the company is doing the right things for the environment.  In addition, 
institutional and stakeholder pressures encourage firms to engage in sustainability initiatives 
(King and Lenox, 2001; Fisher-Varden and Thorburn, 2010). Discretionary initiatives capture 
voluntary disclosures that are aspirational, informational or laudatory in nature.  The coding of 
these initiatives captures firm activities that are related to sustainability but do not have an 
immediate, direct payoff.  Examples include announcements of green or sustainable awards; 
affirmations of the firm’s commitment to sustainability; and initiation of post-consumer 
recycling programs.  Pct. Discretionary reflects the total number of sustainability initiatives that 
are categorized as discretionary and then divided by the total number of sustainable initiatives.  
 
Cognitive Diversity 
 
Cognitive diversity is a composite measure created by summing Blau’s indexes for each 
individual characteristic (Tsui and Gutek, 1999; Chae and Lee, 2010).  This is consistent with 
past literature (Tuggle, et al., 2010; Bantel and Jackson, 1989) and demonstrates when the 
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diversity of the group increases.  Twenty five individual characteristics, political activity, 
political affiliation, veteran status, religion, educational attainment, source of education and 
functional background, were converted to binary measures for each director and then a measure 
of dispersion was calculated for each characteristic.  See appendix 3. The measures of dispersion 
were then summed and adjusted for small group bias (Lambert, 1992). 
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
The RiskMetrics database (formerly the IRRC database) combines firm and individual 
director-level data drawn from corporate filings.  The database was used to retrieve director-level 
data.  Director name, age, gender, nationality, tenure, job characteristics and functional 
background experience (in most cases current job/career field) were extracted from the database.  
This data was then supplemented by several sources.  Corporate annual reports were consulted 
for several of the companies.  These provided validation of demographic information; in depth 
biographies and affiliations about their corporate directors.  The nndb.com database also 
provided validation of the demographic characteristics as well as information about careers, 
education, background and value characteristics such as veteran status and political affiliation.  
The Federal Election Commission, through its website, fec.gov, also provides several databases 
on political contributors, both to political parties and to political action committees.  
Functional Background has been used in management research as a proxy for cognitive 
diversity by Goodstein, Guatam & Boeker (1994) for board members and by Hambrick (1996) 
and by Bentel (1993) in relation to the top management team.  Consistent with Goodstein, 
Guatam and Boeker (1994) we use occupational groupings to assess functional background 
(Executive, Board Director, Retired, Lawyer, Finance, Consulting, CPA, Academic, Political, 
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and Other).  This work was based on Pfeffer (1972) and (1973) and Kosnik (1990) and the data 
is included in the RiskMetrics database.  While some researchers have used up to sixteen 
categories of background coding (e.g., Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996); several of the categories 
had no or very few directors, these were condensed into the ‘other’ category as per previous 
research (Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson, 2010). 
Functional background has been discussed by a host of researchers from Hambrick 
(1996), in his top management team theories, to Westphal and Milton (2000); Goodstein, 
Guatam and Boeker (1994); Peterson, Philpot and O’Shaughnessy (2007); and Milliken and 
Martins (1996).  Like Ramirez (2003) all of these researchers have recognized that importance of 
background in the way executives frame issues and solve problems. 
School represents the type of school the director attended, while Education represents the 
type of degree the director attained.  Education also goes beyond just the discipline or degree.  
Based on the work of Hambrick, et al. (1996); Westphal and Milton (2000) and Westphal and 
Stern (2006); two measures of education were used.  First, a measure based on the source of the 
education included a dichotomous coding of each director as having attended either an elite 
university or not; a private university or not; a public university or not; or not having received 
any formal education.  Second, a measure of the type of education included a dichotomous 
coding of each directors based on their highest level of education PhD, JD, MD, MBA, Masters 
or other.   
Political Involvement is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for individual board members 
who self-report political membership in a party or make donations to political groups and 0 for 
those who do not. Political viewpoint is a dichotomous measure of political affiliation with 1 for 
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individuals identifying with conservative causes and 0 for those who do not.  Veteran status is a 
dichotomous variable for individuals who self-report military service (coded 1) and religious 
affiliation is a dichotomous variable for individuals who self-report membership in a religious 
group of any kind.  There has been some research in the social sciences considering differences 
amongst individuals based solely on their political choices.  The use of these variables is 
consistent with work by Brooks (2006). 
 
Tenure 
 
Tenure is a moderating variable hypothesized to influence the relationship between cognitive 
board diversity and the type and frequency of initiatives. As board directors enter and exit the 
board, the group dynamics necessarily change.  Individual directors learn to reduce interpersonal 
barriers, which lowers coordination costs and maintains the benefits of diverse viewpoints.  As 
Kosnick (1990) pointed out, there is a compositional effect to boards and use of average 
measures account for the changes to the board and resulting changes to the interpersonal 
activities.    Tenure is measured as the average number of years the directors have continuous 
service on the board.  This view of tenure reflects positive changes to the individual performance 
of directors (Katz, 1982) and positive changes to the group dynamic (Martins and Milliken, 1996 
and Kosnik, 1990).  Therefore a new board director would be coded as “0” for no continuous 
service on the board and each year the board director remained would yield a higher positive 
number.  As boards stayed together the average of their tenure would increase. 
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Controls 
 
We included controls that are theoretically related to our research question.  The 
Compustat database was used to gather information on the firm and industry controls.  Although 
the sample includes the largest US firms, the distribution in terms of size is skewed.  We control 
for the relative size of firms in two ways.  Natural Log of Revenue, consistent with Ruigrok, et 
al. (2006), given that our initial sample had a median 2004 sales of $26,587 million and a range 
of $15,747 to $258,681 million, the raw revenue numbers were converted into natural log of the 
revenue.  Natural Log of Employees was also considered, and given the range of firm size was 
converted into the natural log of number of employees.  Organizational slack, the non-deployed 
resources available to the firm for new initiatives (Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari and Turner, 2004), 
was suggested by Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) as a potential rival explanation to differences 
in organizational outcomes.  Firms which have greater levels of organizational slack have 
additional freedom of action with regard to competitive moves (Hambrick, Cho and Chen; 1996).  
In addition, firms with greater slack have the resources necessary to make greater voluntary 
environmental investments (Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2010).  A one-year lagged measure of 
firm performance, Profits, or income from continuing operations attributable to the firm 
(consistent with the Fortune 500 methodology), was also included to be consistent with their 
methodology.   
To test the financial performance measure, I have chosen three discrete periods of time to 
test whether firm’s see any improvement in their financial position as a result of implementing 
sustainability initiatives.  Schendler (2009) makes the case that the positive impact of 
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sustainability must be felt immediately but also over the long-term.  Consistent with Russo and 
Fouts (1997) who felt that two years represented “an adequate period in which to test the 
influence of environmental performance” (544) I tested the return on assets one year into my 
sample and at each year in the sample, 2008 is shown in the table.    The primary SIC was 
included to capture those firms within manufacturing and extractive (mining and energy) sectors 
as opposed to firms in the service industries.  The primary SIC was included to capture those 
firms within manufacturing and extractive (mining and energy) sectors as opposed to firms in the 
service industries.  The primary SIC for each firm was gathered from the Mergent Online 
database.  Firms where the primary SIC was manufacturing or extractive were coded as a “1” 
consistent with Delmas and Burbano (2011), who posited that industry, particularly brown 
industries (those more likely to have negative externalities – manufacturing and extractive 
firms), is an important component in whether firms signal the market place about sustainable 
activity.  
Past events (Finklestein, et al., 2009) may suggest whether a firm focuses on 
sustainability and environmental issues; therefore environmental events (EPA Incidents) were 
measured consistent with Meyer (1995) by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).  The United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains the TRI database which was used to 
find negative environmental events as a control for whether the company in question had a 
negative impact on the environment. Climate Leaders is meant as a proxy for leadership in the 
field of sustainable business practices, and is represented here by the program, since 
discontinued, which was a voluntary commitment by firms to be a leader in environmental 
stewardship.  As such they are strong signals.  In addition, the program provides information 
about when a firm joined.   
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All voluntary disclosures for the sample firms were included as a control variable Total 
Initiatives, as a measure of propensity to disclose (Acquisti, John and Loewenstein, 2012).   
The size of the board was controlled.  A larger board indicates that each individual 
member has a smaller impact (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) and therefore board size, or the 
number of board members for each firm in IRRC, was controlled. 
Duality is a measure of the instances where the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of 
the board of directors.  There is extensive and conflicting literature as to the impact of CEO 
duality on the firm and its performance stemming from the agency theory of the firm (Elsayed, 
2007).    
Demographic diversity is a composite measure created by summing Blau’s indexes for 
individual characteristics (Chae and Lee, 2010) and additional information is included in 
appendix 4.  Tsui and Gutek (1999) asked for more rigorous diversity methodologies and the use 
of the Blau’s index is consistent with current literature (Tuggle, et al., 2010).  Race, gender, 
ethnicity and age have been used as proxies for demographic diversity.  Race has been widely 
used in management research.  Peterson, Philpot & O’Shaugnessy; Westphal & Stern (2006) and 
Miller & Triana (2009) all consider the corporate governance implications of race.  It is a 
dichotomous variable coded on the 2000 US Census racial categories as reported for individual 
directors in RiskMetrics.  The Census used six categories which do not match well with those in 
the sample, White, Black, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander and “some other race”.  For our purposes, race is dichotomously coded for each director.  
Each director was coded dichotomously as being Caucasian, or not; African-American, or not; 
Hispanic, or not; Asian, or not; or other.  As mentioned above, some US Census categories, such 
28 
 
as nationality or race, were so under-represented their category could be collapsed into other 
with no impact on results.  Gender is a dichotomous variable coded 0 for males and 1 for 
females.  This variable has been considered by Peterson, Philpot & O’Shaughnessy (2007); 
Grosvold, et al. (2007); Westphal & Stern (2006) and Nguyen & Faff (2006).  Ethnicity is a 
dichotomous variable based on the Hofstede scale coded as US, Canadian, Mexican, European, 
Japanese, Australian, Mainland Asian, from Central or South America, or from the Middle East, 
including Africa.  Westphal & Stern (2006) included ethnicity in their sample to assist in looking 
for non-obvious links between board members, while Palmer & Varner (2007) cataloged TMT 
diversity.  A sample consisting of all directors in the RiskMetrics database for 2004 yields a 
median age for a US corporate director as 60, with a range of 29 to 95.  Age becomes a 
continuous variable and is calculated based on the absolute difference in age of the director and 
the median age for all directors.   
 
Data Analysis 
 
A Poisson regression technique is appropriate for event studies such as this one for measuring 
the number of rare events that occur during a period of time, in this case from 2004 through 
2010.  As tables 6, 7 and 8 assert, for most of this sample, there are no or very few initiatives.  
Table 6 shows that of the 356 firms in the sample, 202 have no operational initiatives, while 
table 7 shows that 155 firms in the same sample have no discretionary initiatives.  As table 8 
indicates, a sizable part of the sample, 141 firms, has conducted neither operational nor 
discretionary initiatives.  Therefore, a zero-inflated Poisson regression model (Lambert, 1992) 
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was used due to the very large number of cells which contained a zero.  A significant Vuong test 
indicates that the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression is an appropriate choice. The test was 
significant for each hypothesis.   
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics including means and standard deviations for the 
variables and the correlations.   
INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
Results  
 
Supporting H1 model 2 in table 3 shows that cognitive diversity was significantly associated 
with sustainable initiatives.  Firms with cognitively-diverse boards of directors launch fewer 
Sustainable Initiatives than firms with less cognitively-diverse boards.  Within the parameters 
that this is a McFadden’s pseudo R2 in a Poisson regression and not a true R2, more of the 
variance in discretionary initiatives was explained by cognitive diversity and the control 
variables than was explained of the variance in operational initiatives.  That said, the inclusion of 
Cognitive Diversity raised the pseudo R
2
 from 0.364 to 0.371. 
 Several of the firm-level control variables remained significant.  Revenue, Profits and 
Employees and SIC; as well as the past performance measures, EPA Incidents and participation 
in Climate Leaders, were also significant.  Duality was significant and negatively related to the 
number of sustainability initiatives.  Size and Profits were not significantly related to Sustainable 
Initiatives. 
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Table 4 shows support for H2, the percentage of Discretionary Initiatives is significant 
and positively related to Sustainable Initiatives.  The firms that engage in a greater percentage of 
discretionary initiatives; that is, are able to resolve the conflicts around the issue of sustainability 
and move beyond those related directly to financial performance; will engage in more 
sustainability initiatives.  The control variables continue to be significant with the exception of 
Size and Profits.  The inclusion of percentage of Discretionary Initiatives raises the pseudo R
2
 
from 0.364 to 0.373. 
Table 6 does not show support for H3, however if the standard for significance were to be 
relaxed, the relationship would be significant at the 0.10 level (Model 18).  Tenure was 
positively related to Discretionary Initiatives (Model 17) as a main effect.  The interaction of 
these two continuous variables, tenure and cognitive diversity, was not significant in Model 18, 
although the explanatory power of the variance in sustainable initiatives 0.353.  Once again there 
were significant relationships between firm level controls (Revenue and Employees) and past 
performance controls (EPA Incidents and participation in Climate Leaders).  Duality was again 
significant and negatively related to the variance in these types of initiatives.  Unlike the other 
firm-level variables, the relationship between Profits and Sustainability Initiatives was not 
significant although Size is now significant.  
    
Discussion 
 
With this article we explore the relationship between board cognitive diversity and the launch of 
operational and discretionary sustainability initiatives.  By linking corporate governance and 
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sustainability we address several key issues that have heretofore been under-represented in the 
management literature.   
We find that while the ability for cognitively-diverse boards to enact operational 
sustainability initiatives is not impacted, discretionary initiatives are curtailed.  This suggests that 
busy boards, fractured by fault lines (Lau and McLaughlin, 2005) along experience, values and 
backgrounds, struggle to find consensus when the task is not directly related to the 
institutionally-mandated parts of their work.  While the board has responsibility to guide the firm 
through its top management team, when the board has neither a requirement to act, through 
institutional pressure, or a mandate to act, through consensus of the board, then the board is less 
likely to act. 
We also find that long-serving boards are may be more likely to engage in discretionary 
sustainability initiatives than boards with less time together.  While this is consistent with the 
literature on tenure (Hambrick, 2007; Katz, 1992), the connection between the role of tenure and 
sustainability initiatives had not previously been explored.     
These two findings may extend the UN concept of sustainability which posits that 
sustainability is the tradeoff between “the ability of current generations to meet their needs 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs” (World Commission on 
Economic Development, 2013: 16).  Given the institutional pressures for greater board diversity, 
including cognitive diversity (Krus, Morgan and Ginsburg, 2012) and the institutional pressure 
for action on sustainability initiatives (Marshall and Brown, 2003; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-
Sanchez, 2010; Fisher-Varden and Thorburn, 2010; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996), firms may 
seek to balance these potentially conflicting social goals.  Boards may engage in actions such as 
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expanding the size of the board to encompass directors with new experiences, values and 
backgrounds rather than replacing board directors.  Boards may add demographically diverse 
directors who have low cognitive diversity from the existing board, for example selecting 
directors with common educational or functional backgrounds.  Boards may also temper the 
impact of new cognitively-diverse board directors by simultaneously adding directors with low 
cognitive diversity.  Given that new board directors joining the board together may form a cohort 
(Pfeffer, 1983) adding members with high and low cognitive diversity might ease the 
coordination difficulties between the new and seasoned directors.     
There are a number of additional explanations for these results.  Firms may be less likely 
to voluntarily disclose all of their initiatives in real time, which would require an even more 
retrospective methodology to collect.  The methodology with which the data was gathered for 
this paper allows for firms to engage in important sustainability initiatives, and if they were not 
announced, or even announced as other than sustainability initiatives, they would not be included 
in this study.  While the assumption is that firms would announce all of their sustainability 
initiatives so that they can gain the positive firm and reputational benefits (Fisher-Varden and 
Thorburn, 2010), we must consider the alternative that firms may want to disguise their true 
intention with regard to initiatives that could differentiate them from rivals.   
Although other researchers have found a connection between a sustainability mindset and 
firm performance (King and Lenox, 2001), this sample had no significant finding.  This paper 
attempted to find a relationship after one year (2005), after four years (2008) and over the full 
course of the study (2010).  Given the economic downturn in the United States that was still 
underway in 2010, it was unlikely the performance measure was “clean” of other micro and 
macroeconomic effects.  2005 may have not allowed for enough time for the payback for these 
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discretionary initiatives, which can have longer lag times along with greater uncertainty of 
returns.      
The signal on cognitive diversity is weaker than the signal on demographic diversity. 
There are demographic variables upon which almost all directors can be categorized, including 
gender, age and race, and these variables are discrete (as of this report there are no director who 
claim to be transgender) and clearly expressed.  These are variables that are regularly available 
from multiple sources.  Cognitive diversity variables are, in contrast, often not clearly expressed 
or discrete.  Military service may indicate a strong degree of patriotism in younger directors or 
the bad luck of a low draft number for older directors.  In either case, unless the directors have 
discussed their military service at some point in the media or maintains it as part of their official 
biography; it would be hard to know it was part of their background. Likewise religious and 
political beliefs are knowable only when revealed by the director.  Additionally, cognitive 
diversity is still evolving, as evidenced by the latest Pew Research Report, which explores how 
values are changing in the American electorate over the past 35 years.   While there is a strong 
affiliation between conservatism and the GOP brand and liberalism and the Democrat party, 
these are not universally held.  Both parties are broad umbrellas and members are free to reject 
specific aspects of the party beliefs or re-write them within party sub-groups.  Views on the 
environment are not universally held amongst party members and may even be situation based, 
varying based on the company the director keeps. 
   The study is also limited in that it equates all military, religious and educational 
experiences as similar.  The viewpoints of an 80-year old director who volunteered for service as 
naval officer and was victorious in World War II would be very different from a 60-year old 
director drafted for a year of jungle fighting as an enlisted man in Vietnam, and both would have 
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a very different mindset from young executives who fought in the Gulf Wars.  Viewpoints would 
also vary in the church; the Roman Catholic Church welcomes both those who attend daily 
service and those who are “Poinsettias,” attending church on Christmas Day.  Christian 
denominations vary widely in their interpretation on the role of institutions and even the 
importance of the Old and New Testament.  Even the education experience wouldn’t be uniform 
with vast changes to campuses for those who attended in the 1950s, 1970s and 1990s.  
Table 2 includes some interesting results regarding the variable for duality, which was 
beyond the focus of the study.  The mean for duality is 0.73 – 73% of firms within the sample 
have a CEO who also serves as the Chairman of the Board.  This is lower than the Fortune 100 in 
which 84% of firms had CEO duality.  The data from Chen, Lin and Yi (2008) suggests that 
firms with dual role CEOs are larger, older and with more businesses.  Those results are 
consistent with ours.  Chen et al. (2008) further suggest that duality had been decreasing since 
the 1990s in response to improved corporate governance even though neither they nor Dalton 
and Daily (2007) could find a link between duality and firm performance.  Given that 73% of 
firms in this sample, and 84% of the Fortune 100 have CEO duality, the suggestion could be 
made that while the academic literature continues to consider this question, it has largely been 
resolved amongst practitioners.      
The question for firms is how to reap the benefits of diversity, such as wider searches for 
solutions and greater exposure to successful initiatives from other firms, while at the same time 
launching discretionary sustainability initiatives and accepting the rewards that result.  A recent 
paper by Eidelman, et al. (2012) may offer a possible explanation for why cognitive diversity 
dampens all meaningful activity.  They offer the suggestion that people default toward 
conservative thought, based on their experiences and values, and that when time is short, for 
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example, a minor item on a crowded board agenda, directors do not engage in higher-order 
thinking, but rather accept thinking that is conservative in nature. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 INDIVIDUAL DIRECTOR DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The dataset created for this study was the compilation of data from several independent 
databases.  The first step in the process was downloading the corporate information available on 
their site for each of the firms in the Forbes 500 for 2004.  Firms in the fields of financial 
services, insurance and those firms which were conglomerates were removed from the database, 
consistent with Gompers et al. (2003), via a review of SIC codes. 
At this point the database was constructed in three parts.  The individual director 
cognitive and demographic variables; the firm-level data for control variables; and the firm-level 
voluntary disclosures were each collected separately. 
 
Individual Director Dataset 
The IRRC Risk Metrics database of directors was downloaded for 2004 for all firms in 
the Risk Metrics database.  This included but was not limited to the 356 firms in the database; 
this allowed for cross-checking of data on individual directors.  For example, when a director 
biography was incomplete on a corporate website, the interlocking firms in the database, but not 
in the sample, could be checked to minimize missing values.  This database provided the 
following information about the directors: 
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Name 
 Gender 
 Firm of Employment 
 Title 
 Tenure 
 Age 
 Ethnicity (although classified as Caucasian, Black, Hispanic, or Unknown) 
 Nationality 
 
Many data points suffered from incomplete data on some or all variables.  In some cases 
the “name” field, was missing as the database included only a first initial or a nickname.  The 
database also lacked other variables of interest.  In the event of a discrepancy between the IRRC 
database and a subsequent source, the data from IRRC was maintained.   
Although the IRRC database is designed specifically for users to research board directors 
and corporate governance, the other datasets used in this study were not created for these 
purposes.  As a result, there is little chance the data itself is biased.  To guard against bias in 
collection each firm was first coded with its ranking in the Fortune 500 and that number replaced 
the name of the firm in the collected dataset.  The directors were then sorted alphabetically by 
last name.  This served the purpose of simultaneously allowing for the completion of director 
data across multiple firms and further obscuring the relationship of the directors to a focal firm.  
While some directors were still known to the data collectors (the author and an undergraduate 
student hired for data collection and data validation), the ability to collect data in a manner that 
would maximize or minimize a diversity score was very difficult to impossible.  The two 
collectors worked at different times and at different computer stations and the author would 
randomly re-insert directors into the daily work by the other person as a check on the data.  
There were no discrepancies in the data, although there were director variables that one collector 
could find that the other could not, as this will become clearer below; and these were discussed 
by both collectors. 
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The second database accessed was the nndb.com database.  The public database has the 
following mission (www.nndb.com/about/): 
NNDB is an intelligence aggregator that tracks the activities of people we have 
determined to be noteworthy, both living and dead. Superficially, it seems much like a "Who's 
Who" where a noted person's resume is available (the usual information such as date of birth, a 
biography, and other essential facts.)   But it mostly exists to document the connections between 
people, many of which are not always obvious. A person's otherwise inexplicable behavior is 
often understood by examining the crowd that person has been associating with.  The NNDB 
Mapper is a visual tool for exploring the connections between people in NNDB, linking them 
together through family relations, corporate boards, movies and TV, political alliances, and 
shadowy conspiracy groups. 
It builds its map by aggregating data from public sources generally on the following 
criteria for each person: 
 
 Name 
 Birthplace 
 Gender 
 Race/Ethnicity 
 Sexual Orientation 
 Occupation 
 Nationality 
 Significant family relationships 
 Education 
  High School 
  College 
  Graduate School 
  School Affiliations (trustee, academic) 
 Professional Experience 
 Board Experience 
 Community Service 
 Foundations 
 Interesting information (played a professional sport, arrested, is an activist) 
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The third database accessed for each director was located on the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) public website.  The database is constructed to allow verification of donor 
information and prevent violations of United States Election Law.   
 
A few issues arose.  Although in some cases it was necessary to validate the party 
affiliations of the candidates, in the vast majority of cases the party affiliation of the candidates 
was known.  When directors gave to multiple parties across the political spectrum, the director 
was coded as politically active, but not conservative or liberal.  This was the database that was 
most error-filled.  For example, names were frequently misspelled (inconsequentially – multiple 
spelling of first names); directors were able to donate under multiple employers; and directors 
were in many cases in violation of donation limits. As such, the database was unfortunately the 
least reliable but thankfully the narrowest in scope.  That said, in the event the nndb database 
indicated a political preference, and the FEC database had the director giving to both parties, the 
director was judged to be a “non-preference” individual with respect to party donations.  This 
was done based on the specificity of the FEC database and the logic that a person who is a 
Republican but donates to a Democrat can not be assumed to be either a conservative or a liberal.  
The database includes the following information: 
  
 Name 
 Residency 
 Employer 
 Donations to political campaigns 
 
If the director did not appear in the nndb.com or FEC database, the collectors conducted 
searches on Lexis-Nexis and in Bing.  This proved a good way to capture information on 
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religious affiliation and military service as this produced both information about their director’s 
private lives and the director’s employer, for external directors. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE DATASET COLLECTION METHOD 
 
 
As with the director dataset, the voluntary disclosure dataset was compiled and validated 
by two individuals (the author and an undergraduate student hired for this purpose).  The dataset 
was compiled by conducting a count of press releases for the firms identified from the Fortune 
500 on each firm’s website or via Lexis-Nexis in the absence of a website archive.  In a few 
instances, there were companies who did not make any voluntary disclosures during this period.  
First, 81 firms were selected as a pretest.  These companies were hand-counted by the 
author using the title of the press release and the following definitions for each year 2004 
through 2009 and the first six months of 2010: 
 
Total Initiatives: the sum total of all press releases for that company for that year as listed on 
their website or found through Lexis-Nexis 
 
Sustainability Initiatives: the sum total of all press releases for a company for a year as 
listed on their website or found through Lexis-Nexis (see Figure 4) that have 
ANYTHING to do with: 
 
 Environmentalism (including reactions to protests/activism) 
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 Traditional environmental issues (recycling, waste clean-up, clean air, clean 
water, conservation) 
 Newer environmental issues (climate change, carbon footprint) 
 Any mentions of the EPA 
 “Green” – unless out of environmental/sustainability context 
 Alternative energy production methods 
 References to environmental scoring/rating agencies or systems (Climate Leaders, 
Climate Counts, Climate Scoreboard, Green Ranking, GEMS) 
 
Operational Initiatives: the sum total of Efficiency and Growth Initiatives (see figures 2 
and 5). 
 
Efficiency Initiatives:  the sum total of all press releases for a company for a year 
listed on their website or found through Lexis-Nexis that are sustainable 
initiatives and indicate an attempt, or promote a past success with regard to 
reducing expenses or gaining efficiency (including LEED building projects).  
These initiatives were also considered as cost saving during the course of the 
study. 
Growth Initiatives: the sum total of all press releases for a company for a year 
listed on their website or found through Lexis-Nexis that are sustainable 
initiatives and indicate an attempt, or promote a past success with regard to 
developing new business models or geographic or product diversification.  These 
initiatives were also considered as business building initiatives during the course 
of the study. 
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Discretionary Initiatives: the sum total of all press releases for a company for a 
year listed on their website or found through Lexis-Nexis that are sustainable 
initiatives that are aspirational, such as the inclusion in climate control or 
improvement groups or; company-funded post-consumer recycling programs; 
laudatory or informational (see figures 3 and 5). 
  
After the tabulation of these firm activities, the hired undergraduate student followed the 
same procedure, using these same definitions.  The count of total initiatives was reconciled by 
simple recounts.  There were few errors and both parties were able to look at the archived lists 
and agree on the counts.  In this dataset there was one discrepancy based on the definitions.  The 
author missed the following press release, which was added to the official tally as an efficiency 
initiative: 
 
 “Best Buy, Pew Climate Change Center, Best Energy Efficiency Practices”  
 
The roles then reversed and the undergraduate student then conducted the first count of 
total initiatives along with the classification as growth, efficiency and other and the author 
conducted the second, independent count.  There were some total initiatives that needed to be 
reconciled in addition to approximately forty sustainability initiatives that were either missed or 
placed in the wrong category by one counter or the other.  These were reconciled by reviewing 
each disputed initiative together. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF COGNITIVE DIVERSITY EXPLAINED 
 
 
Cognitive diversity is a construct composed of multiple aspects.  Traditionally this has 
included education, experiences and background.  Here we seek to add values, service and 
political activity as a way to broaden the definition.  Considering each more closely, director 
functional background, a proxy for their professional work experiences, focuses on not just the 
discipline but also the firm, or firms, at which the executive worked.  The greater the diversity of 
those director’s functional backgrounds, the greater the differences in framing amongst those 
directors (Ramirez, 2003).  While it is likely greater functional diversity would lead to greater 
number of options, consistent with Pfeffer (1972), the practical concern of functionally-diverse 
executives is finding a common language or a common framework for discussion.  Likewise, 
different degree types and schools can also yield wide differences in understanding of the 
underlying science and the uncertainty of that science.  Tsui and Gutek (1999) also found a direct 
negative relationship between education and firm performance.  Much of the work on education 
stems from top management team upper echelon theory Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996).  In 
addition, Westphal and Milton (2000) and Westphal and Stern (2006) have all explored 
education as a component of diversity as it relates to boards.  Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) 
focused solely on the underlying discipline, which seems limiting given the network effects of 
shared educational experiences.  The connections to the university go beyond the classroom 
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lectures, and advanced degrees become critical for networking and status effects, as well as the 
knowledge the degree confers.   
Stances toward charitable giving and environmental stewardship have been linked to 
political persuasion (Brooks, 2006).  Conservatives, those who are more apt to believe in 
personal responsibility, minimal government involvement and the power of the free market, 
overwhelmingly self-identify as Republicans in the US.  They are also apt respond differently to 
institutional pressures than Liberals, who overwhelmingly self-identify as Democrats in the US.  
Conservatives would be more likely to seek to avoid, defy or manipulate (Pache and Santos, 
2010) institutional demands based on their belief structure.  The absence of this belief structure 
would suggest compromise and acquiescence from the Pache and Santos (2010) framework.  
Religious affiliation has been linked to environmental stewardship and sacrificing of near-term 
goals for long-term goals (Brooks, 2006).  Although this suggests that religious board directors 
would be more likely to be accepting of sustainability initiatives; the traditional distrust between 
religion and science would increase uncertainty as to the underlying science.  Those who get 
involved (Putnam, 2000) as represented by those who choose to join/donate to a party and those 
who join the military, are people interested in solving problems themselves.  This corresponds 
with avoidance, defiance and manipulation from the Pache and Santos framework (2010). 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
DIVERSITY DEFINITIONS 
 
 
The literature has attempted to determine which form of diversity, cognitive or 
demographic, is more explanatory.  This paper has asserted, based on Ramirez (2003) and others, 
that demographic diversity should have less to do with decision-making than cognitive diversity.  
There is no woman’s math exclusive of math done by men or Hispanic science which is different 
than Middle Eastern, European or Oceanic.  He argues the following: a Hispanic woman and a 
Japanese man attend the same school for their accounting degree and then are hired and trained 
within the same large accounting firm.  At the same time two white males who have grown up in 
similar towns in the American South attend different schools before one joins the same firm as 
our first two accountants and the other opens a local practice.  In solving a complex accounting 
decision the first, seemingly more diverse pair would be expected to recommend similar 
solutions.  The decision would be more similar in fact than the second pair; largely due to the 
differences in their backgrounds, training and values, and how these influence the way they 
frame issues.  As such, demographic differences would not be expected to help directors make 
decisions. 
Demographic diversity also is considered “surface-level” diversity (Jackson, et al., 1995) 
in much of the literature. Immediate judgments are made by such characteristics as age and 
gender, but lasting agreements, or disagreements, are formed based on shared values and 
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experiences which transcend superficial differences. And yet there is much literature, discussed 
above, on demographic diversity and its impact on the firm. 
We see that Model 1 demographic diversity has a significant and positive impact on the 
number of sustainable initiatives.  This suggests that board directors may physically “wear” their 
outsider status into the boardroom.  With faster turnover amongst boards, the opportunity to 
move beyond the superficial is limited and differences become “sticky.”  It may also suggest that 
board members who are different are advocates for minority viewpoints.   Although board 
directors who self-identify as environmental activists are exceedingly rare (just one in my 
dataset); these outsider board directors may have an impact on moving the environmental 
initiatives forward that is much greater than the sheer number of directors would otherwise 
suggest. 
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FIGURE 1: MODEL 
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TABLE 1: DIVERSITY MEASURES 
Cognitive 
Demographic 
Political Veteran Religious Education 
Educational 
Level 
Background  
Active  Active Elite Doctorate Executive Gender 
Conservative  Christian Private JD Board Director Age 
Liberal  Jewish Public Masters Retired Caucasian 
   No Degree MBA Law African-American 
    BA/BS Finance Other Race 
    No Degree Consulting US Citizen 
     Academic European 
     Other Other Nationality 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
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TABLE 3:  FIRM-LEVEL MODELS FOR OPERATIONAL AND DISCRETIONARY 
INITIATIVES AND COGNITIVE DIVERSITY 
 
 Sustainable Initiatives 
 Model  1 Model 2 
 Controls  
Demographic Diversity 7.64 *** 7.95 *** 
Size 0.78  2.26 * 
Tenure 5.26 *** 5.67 *** 
Revenue LN 3.40 ** 4.07 *** 
Profits 1.75  1.90  
Employees LN 6.96 *** 6.22 *** 
Total Initiatives 23.23 *** 23.32 *** 
EPA Incidents 13.73 *** 12.77 *** 
Climate Leaders 10.80 *** 10.89 ** 
Duality -4.60 *** -4.08 *** 
SIC 1.93 * 1.98 * 
Cognitive Diversity   -7.23 *** 
Intercept (Constant) -3.67 *** -2.97 ** 
     
X
2 
3463.29 3515.20 
dF 11 12 
Pseudo R
2 
0.364 0.371 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <0.001 
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TABLE 4: FIRM-LEVEL MODELS FOR SUSTAINABLE INITIATIVES AND THE 
PERCENTAGE OF OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES AND PERCENTAGE OF 
DISCRETIONARY INITIATIVES 
 
 Sustainable Initiatives Sustainable Initiatives 
 Model  3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Controls    Controls  
Demographic 
Diversity 
7.64 *** 7.73 *** 8.17 *** 7.64 *** 7.73 *** 8.17 *** 
Size 0.78  1.93  1.65  0.78  1.93  1.65  
Tenure 5.26 *** 5.35 *** 5.24 *** 5.26 *** 5.35 *** 5.24 *** 
Revenue LN 3.40 ** 4.32 *** 4.26 *** 3.40 ** 4.32 *** 4.26 *** 
Profits 1.75  1.21  1.50  1.75  1.21  1.50  
Employees LN 6.96 *** 6.52 *** 6.23 *** 6.96 *** 6.52 *** 6.23 *** 
Total Initiatives 23.23 *** 23.44 *** 23.59 *** 23.23 *** 23.44 *** 23.59 *** 
EPA Incidents 13.73 *** 12.81 *** 12.78 *** 13.73 *** 12.81 *** 12.78 *** 
Climate Leaders 10.80 *** 11.15 *** 11.48 *** 10.80 *** 11.15 *** 11.48 *** 
Duality -4.60 *** -3.88 *** -4.20 *** -4.60 *** -3.88 *** -4.20 *** 
SIC 1.93 * 2.68 ** 2.49 * 1.93 * 2.68 ** 2.49 * 
Cognitive Diversity   -7.04 *** 0.12    -7.04 *** -7.19 *** 
Pct. Operational   -4.67 *** -3.72 ***       
Pct. Discretionary         4.64 *** 3.72 *** 
Cognitive Diversity X  
Pct. Operational 
    
-3.09 *** 
  
 
 
  
Cognitive Diversity X 
Pct. Discretionary 
    
  
  
 
 
3.09 ** 
Intercept (Constant) -3.67 *** -3.20 *** -2.25 * -3.67 *** -3.66 *** -4.59 *** 
             
X
2 
3463.29 3537.22 3546.71 3463.29 3537.22 3546.71 
dF 11 13 14 11 13 14 
Pseudo R
2 
0.364 0.373 0.374 0.364 0.373 0.374 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <0.001 
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TABLE 5:  FIRM-LEVEL MODELS FOR OPERATIONAL AND DISCRETIONARY 
INITIATIVES AND COGNITIVE DIVERSITY 
 Operational Initiatives Discretionary Initiatives 
 Model  9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 Controls  Controls   
Demographic Diversity -0.98  -0.97  9.13 *** 9.47 *** 
Size -1.63     -1.42  0.95  2.62 ** 
Tenure 2.49 ** 2.55 ** 4.31 *** 4.83 *** 
Revenue LN -1.12  -1.03  4.01 *** 4.55 ** 
Profits -3.77 ** -3.77 ** 4.53 *** 4.73 *** 
Employees LN 4.53 *** 4.44 *** 5.80 *** 4.86 *** 
Total Initiatives 12.46 *** 12.48 *** 19.08 *** 19.31 *** 
EPA Incidents 9.73 *** 9.46 *** 7.13 *** 6.45 *** 
Climate Leaders 8.77 *** 8.76 *** 3.58 *** 3.73 *** 
Duality -2.81 * -2.71 * -3.04 ** -2.54  
SIC 2.25 * 2.25 * 2.86 ** 2.78 * 
Cognitive Diversity   -0.66    -7.75 *** 
Intercept (Constant) 1.03  1.05  -5.18 *** -4.11 *** 
         
X
2 
842.40 842.84 2393.14 2452.42 
dF 11 12 11 12 
Pseudo R
2 
0.306 0.307 0.309 0.376 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <0.001 
 
 
 
 
  
65 
 
TABLE 6: FIRM-LEVEL MODELS FOR SUSTAINABLE INITIATIVES AND TENURE 
AND DISCRETIONARY INITIATIVES AND TENURE  
 
 Sustainable Initiatives Discretionary Initiatives 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
 Controls  Controls     
Demographic 
Diversity 
7.57 *** 7.95 *** 8.02 *** 9.08 *** 9.47 *** 9.53 *** 
Size 0.12  2.26 * 2.12 * 0.45  2.64 ** 2.49 * 
Revenue LN 3.30 ** 4.07 ***    4.20 *** 4.07 *** 4.55 *** 4.69 *** 
Profits 2.68 ** 1.90  1.60  5.33 *** 4.73 *** 4.36 *** 
Employees LN 7.38 *** 6.22 *** 6.30 *** 6.16 *** 4.86 *** 4.95 *** 
Total Initiatives 22.63 *** 23.32 *** 23.05 *** 18.59 *** 19.31 *** 19.01 *** 
EPA Incidents 13.60 *** 12.77 *** 12.77 *** 6.91 *** 6.45 *** 6.39 *** 
Climate Leaders 10.88 *** 10.89 *** 10.99 *** 3.61 *** 3.76 *** 3.86 *** 
Duality -5.81 *** -4.08 ** -4.14 ** -4.01 *** -2.54  -2.58 * 
SIC 1.83  1.98 * 1.85  2.92 ** 2.78 ** 2.71 ** 
Tenure   5.67 *** 2.42 *   4.83  2.36 * 
Cognitive Diversity   -7.23 *** -0.86    -7.75  -1.03  
Tenure X  
Cognitive Diversity 
 
 
 
 
-1.59      -1.64  
Intercept 
(Constant) 
-3.03 ** -2.97 ** -3.30 ** -4.84 *** -4.11 *** -4.22  
             
X
2 
3436.37 3515.20 3517.70 2374.66 2452.42 2455.07 
dF 10 12 13 10 12 13 
Pseudo R
2 
0.362 0.371 0.371 0.341 0.353 0.353 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <0.001 
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FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY OF OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES BY FIRM 
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FIGURE 3: FREQUENCY OF DISCRETIONARY INITIATIVES BY FIRM 
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FIGURE 4: FREQUENCY OF SUSTAINABLE INITIATIVES BY FIRM 
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FIGURE 5: SCATTERPLOT OF FIRM OPERATIONAL AND DISCRETIONARY 
INITIATIVES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
